CO129-585-4 Sino-Japanese conflict- Japanese air raids on China 26-1-1940 - 5-7-1940 — Page 35

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the sincerity

of these regrets and represented strongly

to Mr.Tani the bad effect which the Japanese action had had

not only on Franco-Japanese relations, but on world opinion.

He drew attention to the fact that in the United States this

incident would have much the same effect as the original

bombing of Canton, and it would also convince world opinion

that the Japanese Government were unable to secure the

obedience of the military authorities to their orders. Mr.

Tani knew that no arms and war material were going

over this railway and that in fact the bulk of the arms

reaching the Chinese Government came either from Germany

or the Soviet Union.

4.

Mr.Tani said that it was important for the Japanesc

Government to prevent not only arms but certain other goods,

such as lorries and petrol, from reaching the Chinese

Government. He suggested that the French Government

should approach this problem in the spirit of realism which

had brought about the solution of the Asama Maru incident.

5. Mr.Tani then went on to suggest that the French

Government should recognise that a state of war existed

in China, asserting that His Majesty's Government had

already done so as regards North China. The Allies were

now exercising a strict contraband control against their

enemy and the Japanese asked no more of the French

Government than that they should prevent certain specified

goods from reaching Japan's enemy. He fully realised the

embarrassment which the League of Nations resolutions

might cause to the French Government in coming to some

arrangement with the Japanese Government over this question,

and suggested therefore that it would be sufficient if

the French Government refrained from repairing the railway.

Mr.Tani then said that extremely easy terms were being

granted/

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